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Rethinking the Costs of International Delegations
Daniel Abebe*

A prominent criticism of U.S. delegations to international institutions – or international
delegations – focuses on agency costs. The criticism begins by drawing a stark contrast
between international delegations and domestic delegations. For domestic delegations to
agencies, U.S. congressional, executive and judicial oversight mechanisms are present to
try and maintain the agency’s democratic accountability. Since the agency is
democratically accountable, the agency costs are low. For international delegations of
binding authority to international institutions, however, the conventional wisdom is that
oversight mechanisms are absent and the U.S. cannot monitor the international
institution to ensure it acts within its delegated authority. In the international context,
agency costs are high. The fear of high agency costs through the loss of democratic
accountability, so the argument goes, justifies constitutionally inspired limits on
international delegations. This Article challenges the conventional wisdom. It argues that
the agency costs claim rests on weak foundations as agency costs will likely vary
depending on the type, scope, and nature of the delegation; that the U.S. has actually
implemented many of the domestic oversight tools in the international context, ensuring a
surprisingly high level of accountability to American interests; and that the potential
costs and benefits of international delegations are not meaningfully different from those
in domestic delegations. In other words, there is little systematic difference between
domestic and international delegations with respect to the efficacy of oversight
mechanisms or the balance of costs and benefits. The Article concludes that
constitutionally inspired limits on binding international delegations are probably
unnecessary because they will increase the costs for the U.S. to participate in potentially
beneficial international cooperation.

*

Assistant Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. Thanks to Anu Bradford, Tom
Ginsburg, Todd Henderson, Aziz Huq, Jonathan Masur, Eric Posner, Lior Strahilevitz, and the participants
at the Harvard-Duke Foreign Affairs Law Conference for comments and suggestions. All mistakes are
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INTRODUCTION

Congress and the President currently delegate effective decision-making authority
to federal entities and to international institutions. Although most accept domestic
delegations to federal entities as part of the modern administrative state, some fear the
prospect of international delegations to distant, unaccountable and supposedly antiAmerican international institutions and propose strict limits on them. In other words, they
claim that international delegations pose a distinctive democratic accountability dilemma
that domestic delegations do not. To frame the problem, consider two stylized examples.
Example One. Congress and the President have long delegated
authority to the Federal Reserve, a domestic entity, to manage the U.S.
financial system. In 2010, in response to the financial crisis, Congress and the
President empowered the Federal Reserve to develop new regulations for
banks. The Federal Reserve, through its Board of Governors, has since issued
some forty-seven regulatory measures with neither open meetings nor public
discussion of its rulemaking. Congress and the President cannot monitor the
Board of Governors’ activities, participate in the debate, or block any rule
inconsistent with their interests.
Example Two. Congress and the President have long delegated
authority to the United Nations, an international institution, to maintain
international peace and security. In 2011, in response to the Libyan uprising,
Congress and the President sought to use the United Nations as a tool to
implement a plan of military action against the Muammar Gaddafi regime.
Acting through the Security Council, the U.S. sponsored and obtained
successful passage of a resolution after holding open meetings and debate of
the issue. At the same time, a non-permanent member of the Security Council
introduced a resolution condemning the actions of a U.S. ally in the Middle
East. Since the U.S. is a permanent member of the Security Council and holds
a veto, the executive branch was able to monitor this effort, and eventually
block the proposed resolution that was inconsistent with American interests.
Based upon these two examples, it is unclear which species of delegation,
domestic or international, creates greater democratic accountability problems for
Congress and the President. In other words, it is worth considering carefully and closely
whether delegations of authority to international institutions such as the United Nations
indeed create what are called greater “agency costs” than domestic delegations of
authority to bodies such as the Federal Reserve. The conventional wisdom, which is
critical of international delegations, mistakenly suggests that the answer is obvious:
international delegations almost always create higher agency costs than domestic
delegations. According to critics, for domestic delegations U.S. congressional, executive
2

and judicial oversight mechanisms are present to monitor the agency to try and ensure
accountability and democratic legitimacy. Here, agency costs are low. But for
international delegations of binding authority to international institutions, critics contend
that the U.S. oversight mechanisms are absent, leaving the U.S. unable to ensure that the
international institution will act within the bounds of its delegated authority. Moreover,
international institutions are neither representative of U.S. interests nor accountable to the
American public. Therefore, agency costs are high for international delegations and
binding international delegations should either be disfavored or avoided.1
How would critics solve this apparent problem? Most want to limit, but not
entirely oust, international delegations. Some suggest that U.S. courts should adopt
“super-strong” clear statement rules or non self-execution default rules when considering
whether the U.S. has made a binding international delegation. Others suggest that the
U.S. should require that all binding international delegations go through the Article II
treaty process, making them much harder to enact. In the end, the specter of high agency
costs, so the argument goes, justifies modification to constitutional processes in ways that
impose limits on international delegations.
To examine the merits of the agency costs claim, this Article focuses on two
important questions: First, are the oversight tools to manage international delegations and
domestic delegations systematically different in efficacy? Second, is the balance of costs
and benefits for international delegations systematically different from that of domestic
delegations? For the reasons outlined below, I argue that the answer to both questions is
no.
I challenge the key claim that international delegations create high agency costs
because domestic oversight mechanisms are unavailable in the international context. To
the contrary, many of the oversight mechanisms common to domestic delegations are
already present, in different forms, for international delegations as well. The U.S.’s
economic, political and military power makes it uniquely well-placed to influence ex ante
the design and structure of the international institutions to which it might choose to
delegate binding authority, and shape ex post the product of those international
institutions. Because of this influence, the U.S. can replicate some of the domestic
oversight tools—procedural constraints, appropriations, and agenda-setting, for
example—in the international context as well. Indeed, the U.S. has a number of tools
unique to the international environment, ranging from side-payments and foreign aid, to
1

See, e.g., John C. Yoo Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, and the Original
Understanding, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1955 (1999); Julian G. Ku The Delegation of Federal Power to
International Organizations: New Problems with Old Solutions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 71 (2000); Ernest A.
Young, The Trouble with Global Constitutionalism, 38 TEX. INT’L L.J. 527 (2003); Edward T. Swaine, The
Constitutionality of International Delegations, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1492, 1540 (2004); John O. McGinnis,
Medellin and the Future of International Delegations, 118 YALE L.J. 1712, 1714 (2009).
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weighted voting and veto powers, to try to align the international institutions with U.S.
interests. From this perspective, international delegations and domestic delegations are
not categorically distinct on any democratic accountability or agency cost metric:
oversight mechanisms exist in both contexts to reduce agency costs.
I contend that the critics are wrong to conclude that the balance of costs and
benefits from international delegations is systematically different from the balance in the
domestic delegation context. An initial problem is that it is unclear how critics define
agency costs, measure them, and determine when agency costs are high enough to justify
limits on international delegations. Agency costs, moreover, will likely vary depending
on the type of delegation, the scope of the delegation, the issue area and the frequency
with which the international institution is likely to exercise delegated authority, among
other factors.2 Any strong claim about the level of agency costs must, at the very least,
provide a more nuanced analysis of the interactions between the U.S. and international
institutions. In addition, critics don’t specify how high agency costs must be to warrant
constitutional redress. If agency costs are lower than they assume—the claim is
underspecified—then making international delegations more difficult to enact may very
well be a solution in search of a problem. Agency costs are problematic if they outweigh
the potential benefits from binding international delegations. The mere existence of
agency costs, without greater specification, seems insufficient to warrant specific changes
in constitutional process solely to limit international delegations.
In fact, the President and Congress are already fully incentivized to consider
carefully the wisdom of binding international delegations and will take steps to ensure
accountability and reduce agency costs without any modification of constitutional
process. This is reflected in the pattern of U.S. design, control and influence over
international institutions for non-binding international delegations and, given the U.S.’s
incentives to protect American political processes, it is even more likely for binding
international delegations. Since the U.S. would in the vast majority of cases would only
delegate binding authority to an international institution that it could influence, additional
constitutionally inspired limits would be superfluous.
In the end, proposals to raise the enactment costs of all binding delegations create
a crude rule of national constitutional design that will likely limit the ability of Congress
and the President to conduct foreign affairs. A careful analysis of the costs and benefits of
binding international delegation will depend on international political considerations
properly within the national government’s foreign affairs prerogatives. Since
international delegations are given effect by treaty or statute, Congress and the President
2

See Curtis A. Bradley & Judith G. Kelley, The Concept of International Delegation, 71 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 1, 1 (Winter 2008) (describing the various types of international delegations); Andrew T. Guzman
& Jennifer Landsidle, The Myth of International Delegation, 96 CAL. L. REV. 1693 (2008) (questioning the
proper definition of international delegations and exploring the instances in which the U.S. delegates
authority).
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clearly participate in the enactment process, ameliorating some of the accountability and
legitimacy concerns. And of course, if a later Congress and President conclude that the
international delegation is problematic, they can abrogate the delegation through
subsequent legislation without offsetting democratic costs.
This discussion suggests that agency costs in international delegations might not be
higher or categorically distinct from those in domestic delegations. The U.S. has tools to
reduce agency costs in both contexts. If so, the adoption of constitutionally inspired
design rules to raise the enactment costs of all binding international delegations is
unnecessary and probably counterproductive, as such rules will limit the national
government’s flexibility to participate in and delegate to international institutions that
might create benefits for the U.S.
The Article proceeds as follows. Section I describes domestic and international
delegations to set the framework for analysis. Section II evaluates the problems with
international delegations and the proposals to raise the enactment costs of international
delegations. Section III argues that many of the domestic oversight tools are available in
the international context and that the U.S. is particularly well situated to influence the
international institutions exercising delegated authority. The Article concludes with a
discussion of the possible benefits of binding international delegations and suggests that
constitutional limitations on international delegations are unnecessary.

I.

DELEGATIONS: DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL
A.

Domestic Delegations

The regulatory structure governing domestic delegations to administrative
agencies provides the framework through which scholars generally evaluate international
delegations. Although the administrative law literature on domestic delegations is
enormous and a review is beyond the scope of this Article, it is important to sketch an
outline of them to compare and contrast with international delegations. The comparison
will shed light on the type of problems common to domestic delegations and attempts to
address them, and provide background on the critiques for binding delegations as well.
In the U.S., domestic delegations were tools borne out of the increasingly
complex and technical regulatory apparatus of the modern administrative state.3
3

This development, combined with the Supreme Court’s loosening of the non-delegation doctrine, opened
the door to the expansion of domestic delegations. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A
THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW, 132-33 (Harvard 1980) (concluding the non-delegation doctrine is dead); see
also Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315 (2000) (arguing that although the
non-delegation doctrine is no longer recognized, different canons of construction operate as a type of nondelegation principle to oversee the administrative state); Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the
Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1721 (2002) (arguing there is not a nondelegation doctrine and
that agents acting under a statutory grant are exercising executive, not legislative, power).
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Congress, lacking the necessary expertise and resources to address the new regulatory
demands, began to delegate broad authority to executive agencies to issue rules,
directives and regulations in their specified issues areas.4 The benefit is twofold:
Congress can take advantage of agency expertise, producing socially desirable outcomes,
and Congress can focus its resources on issues for which it is better-suited to legislate.5
Despite the potential benefits, delegations create a principal-agent problem,6
namely that Congress and the President7 could not perfectly control their agent, the
domestic agencies exercising delegated authority. After the delegation, neither Congress
nor the President could ensure that the agencies would consistently act within the bounds
of their delegated authority. The agent might deviate from the interest of the principals,
leading to legitimacy and accountability concerns. This is an ongoing problem and the
legal and political science literatures on administrative agencies are filled with examples
of Congress and the President’s difficulties in ensuring the accountability of agencies.8
Agencies shirk, sabotage, develop their own agendas, and engage in other activities that
produce agency costs.9 The greater amount of agency costs, the greater concern that the
agencies are operating independent of Congress and the President’s wishes, reducing the
value of the delegations and potentially leading to bureaucratic drift.10 In light of these
4

See DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARYN O'HALLORAN, DELEGATING POWERS: A TRANSACTION
COST POLITICS APPROACH TO POLICY MAKING UNDER SEPARATE POWERS (1999).
5
See generally JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 23, 142 (1938); CASS SUNSTEIN, AFTER
THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION 23 (1990); James O. Freedman, Expertise and the Administrative Process, 28
ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 363-66 (1976); see also ALFRED C. AMAN, JR. & WILLIAM T. MAYTON,
ADMINISTRATIVE Law 10-12 (1993) (noting the conservation of congressional resources as a benefit of
delegation).
6
Mathew D. MCubbins, Roger G. Noll, & Barry R. Weingast, Administrative Procedures as Instruments of
Political Control, 3 J. L. ECON. & ORG 243, 247 (“The problem of bureaucratic compliance has long been
recognized as a principal-agent problem. Specifically, members of Congress and the president are
principals in an agency relationship with an executive bureau.”). For further background on the principalagent problem, see generally Terry Moe, The New Economics of Organization, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 739
(1984); Barry R. Weingast, The Congressional-Bureaucratic System: A Principal-Agent Perspective, 44
PUB. CHOICE 147 (1984); Barry Mitnick, The Theory of Agency: The Policy ‘Paradox’ and Regulatory
Behavior, 24 PUB. CHOICE 27 (1984).
7
The coalition of Congress that created the agency may be more directly the principal than Congress as a
whole. See McCubbin, Noll, & Weingast, id at 255 ([T]he coalition that forms to create an agency—the
committee that drafted the legislation, the chamber majorities that approved it, and the president who
signed it into law— will seek to ensure that the bargain struck among the members of the coalition does not
unravel once the coalition disbands.”).
8
See JOHN BREHM & SCOTT GATES, WORKING, SHIRKING, AND SABOTAGE: BUREAUCRATIC RESPONSE TO
A DEMOCRATIC PUBLIC (2002); McCubbins, Noll, & Weingast, id; Mathew McCubbins, Roger Noll, &
Barry Weingast, STRUCTURE AND PROCESS, POLITICS AND POLICY: ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS AND
THE POLITICAL CONTROL OF AGENCIES, 75 VA. L. REV. 431 (1989).
9
See Brehm & Gates, id; Matthew D. McCubbins & Talbot Page, A Theory of Congressional Delegation,
in CONGRESS: STRUCTURE AND POLICY 409, 410-14 (Matthew D. McCubbins & Terry Sullivan eds. 1987)
(describing the problems of agency shirking and slippage); Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz,
Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1282-1300 (2006) (discussing
how agency capture in the health and safety context results in overzealous regulations and inefficiencies).
10
See McCubbins, Noll, & Weingast, supra note 7 at 443-44 (noting the structure of an agency must be
designed to be responsive to the constituencies the delegation was meant to satisfy to prevent policy drift);
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problems, scholars have proposed various monitoring and oversight mechanisms to
constrain agencies and more closely align them with the interests of the principal
(Congress or the enacting coalition in Congress). For my purposes, I will simplify and
treat Congress as the principal.
In light of this principal-agent problem, scholars have identified and evaluated
several mechanisms of agency control.11 One common tool for Congress and the
President is the appointment process. Since the President and Congress act together to
nominate and confirm potential appointees, they can coordinate and “arrange for
appointees who more nearly share the political consensus on policy [as] a self-enforcing
mechanism for assuring realiable (sic) agency performance.”12 With appointees in power
who share a common approach serving as agency heads, the agencies might be less likely
to deviate from the interests of Congress and the President, presumably reducing agency
costs and increasing accountability.
Another tool to constrain agents is through ex ante procedural controls.13 Federal
agencies are already subject to procedural constraints through the Administrative
Procedures Act14 but the language is general and not specifically tailored to the different
administrative agencies. The President and Congress, however, could force agencies to
adopt specific decision-making processes, use certain methodologies15 or engage in
agenda-setting16 to narrow agency authority. Still others have suggested that Congress
and the President can consider the institutional design17 of agencies to reduce agency

Kenneth A. Shepsle, Bureaucratic Drift, Coalitional Drift, and Time Consistency: A Comment on Macey, 8
J.L. ECON. & ORG 111 (1992).
11
See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 2245, 2255-69 (evaluating informal
controls on agency action such as “fire alarms”, reliance on experts, and interest group influence).
12
Bureaucracy and Intergovernmental Relations, Analyzing politics book, page 429.
13
Id.
14
Pub. L. No. 79-404, 6o Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706).
15
President Reagan was the first executive to require the U.S.e of cost-benefit analysis in agency decisionmaking. Exec. Order No. 12,291 § 3, 3 C.F.R. 127, 128-30 (1981). For a discussion on cost-benefit
analysis, see MATTHEW ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
(Harvard University Press 2006). At times, administrative agencies have been required to conduct a
feasibility analysis, instead of a cost-benefit analysis. See e.g., Occupational Safey and Health Act of 1970
§ 6, Pub L No 91-596, 84 Stat 1590, 1593, codified at 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (requiring the agency to
ensure “to the extent feasible” that exposure to hazards in the workplace does not harm workers’ health).
For a discussion of the merits of feasibility analysis, see Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Against
Feasibility Analysis, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 657 (2010).
16
In some circumstances, the agenda setting may be broad. See e.g., Exec. Order No. 13563 (2011)
(directing agencies to consider values such as equity, human dignity, fairness, and distributive impacts). In
contrast, Congress may try to control an agency by limiting its discretion. David Epstein & Sharyn
O’Halloran, A Theory of Strategic Oversight: Congress, Lobbyists, and the Bureucracy, 11 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 227, 229 (1995).
17
Christopher R. Berry & Jacob Gersen, The Unbundled Executive, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1385, 1424-26
(2008).
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costs by creating institutional structures that shape the way the agencies operate and
provide greater transparency and limit agency discretion.18
Scholars have also examined the ex post tools available to ensure that the
agencies continue to function within their delegated authority. Judicial review is one
option but, as discussed earlier, it is unlikely to reduce agency costs. But on an ongoing
basis, Congress can use “police-patrols,”19 empower congressional committees to directly
monitor agencies, or authorize individuals, corporations or other parties subject to agency
rulemaking to act as “fire-alarms”20 and report agency misbehavior back to Congress. In
theory, once the Congress observes bureaucratic drift or other problems, they could
threaten to cut agency funding21 or conduct oversight hearings22 to question and
embarrass agency heads.
Similarly, the President has tools to limit agency discretion.23 The President can
issue directives by Executive Order regarding the breadth or agency authority in a
particular area,24 engage in intra-executive review of agency actions and even informally
appropriate authority over agency function.25 The President could threaten to terminate26
or otherwise pressure agency heads to act within their delegated authority.
A final, weaker mechanism to control agencies and reduce agency costs is judicial
review. Individuals, companies and other parties affected by agency decisions could
27

18

Jacob E. Gersen, Designing Agencies, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW
339 (Daniel A. Farber and Anne Joseph O’Connell eds. 2010).
19
Mathew D. McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols
versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J.POL. SCI. 165 (1984)
20
Id at 166; Kagan, supra note 11, at 2258.
21
J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, Public Agencies As Lobbyists, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2217, 2235-36
(2005) (listing the potential sanctions for an agency’s failure to fulfill its mandates).
22
Id.
23
See Kagan, supra note 11, at 2285-2303 (discussing the President Clinton’s U.S.e of formal directives,
OMB review, and personal appropriation to control agency discretion); Sidney A. Shapiro & Ronald F.
Wright, The Future of the Administrative Presidency: Turning Administrative Law Inside-Out, 65 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 577, 583 (2011) (describing presidents’ strategies to control agencies including increasing the size
of the White House staff that oversees agencies, increasing the number of presidential appointees within
agencies, and imposing reporting requirements).
24
For instance, Executive Order 12,580 designated federal agencies as the President’s response authorities
under CERCLA for facilities under their “jurisdiction custody and control.” Exec. Order No. 12580, 61 FR
45871 (August 28, 1996).
25
See DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 21, at 2231-33 (arguing that inter-agency review and coordination
may control agency action); Kagan, supra note 1 (describing presidential appropriation of agency action).
26
See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Saving the Unitary Executive from Those Who Would Destory and Abuse It: A
Review of the Unitary Executive by Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 593,
597-98 (2010) (noting the president can fire an administrator and replace her with someone who shares his
views).
27
Jonathan R. Macey, Separated Powers and Positive Political Theory: The Tug of War Over
Administrative Agencies, 80 GEO. L.J. 671, 675 (1992) (arguing judicial review controls agency capture);
Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Heightened Scrutiny of the Fourth Branch: Separation of Powers
and the Requirement of Adequate Reasons for Agency Decisions, 1987 DUKE L.J. 387, 394-95 (noting
judicial review checks agencies’ ability to favor private interests). .
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bring suit challenging agency regulations in federal court, creating direct judicial
oversight of agencies.28 In theory, the ex ante prospect of ex post legal invalidation of
agency regulations would constrain agency behavior. But the Use of courts to rein in
agencies led to a different issue: an increase of administrative law cases filling the docket
of federal courts.29 Of course, courts lack the resources to adjudicate all administrative
law cases and evaluate agency action, reducing its efficacy as a regulatory mechanism. If
agencies know in advance that the legal system does not have the capacity to review
agency rulemaking, the threat of legal invalidation will not seriously constrain agencies.
The resource issue, combined with the Supreme Court’s decisions in Chevron,30
narrowed the grounds upon which parties could challenge agency decisions and in effect
took one tool for agency review off of the table.31
Despite the fact that no mechanism can fully eliminate agency costs, domestic
delegations are generally uncontroversial32 because, in theory, politically accountable
actors selected through the democratic process can generally review, monitor or

28

The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) provides a cause of action to challenge “final agency action,”
including temporary and permanent regulations. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT, 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2000).
Parties can also seek pre-enforcement judicial review of many agency actions, including review of
regulations interpreting myriad statutes. Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 153-54 (1967). For
different approaches to judicial deference of agency regulations, see generally Antonin Scalia, Judicial
Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511 (1989); Stephen Breyer, Judicial
Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363 (1986).
29
Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, Striking a Devil’s Bargain: The Federal Courts and Expanding Caseloads in
the Twenty-First Century, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 473, 477 (2009) (citing administrative agency
appeals as accounting for nearly 36 percent of cases filed in the Ninth Circuit).
30
Chevron, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). See Cass R. Sunstein,
Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187 (2006); Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s
Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833 (2001); Adrian Vermeule & Jacob E. Gersen, Chevron as a Voting Rule, 116
YALE L.J. 676 (2007).
31
Chevron entails a two-step approach to reviewing agency action: it first asks whether the statute has a
gap or ambiguity, and if so, whether the agency’s interpretation of the ambiguity is reasonable. Chevron,
467 U.S. at 842-43. Later the Court clarified that Chevron rests on the “presumption that Congress, when it
left ambiguity in a statute meant for implementation by an agency, understood that the ambiguity would be
resolved, first and foremost, by the agency, and desired the agency (rather than the courts) to possess
whatever degree of discretion the ambiguity allows.” Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 740-41
(1996). Numerous scholars have written on the effect of Chevron. See e.g., Linda R. Cohen & Matthew L.
Spitzer, Solving the Chevron Puzzle, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 65 (1994); Orin S. Kerr, Shedding Light
on Chevron: An Empirical Study of the Chevron Doctrine in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 15 YALE J. ON
REG. 1 (1998); Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Judicial Incentives and Indeterminacy in Substantive
Review of Administrative Decisions, 44 DUKE L.J. 1051 (1995).
32
Some people think that all delegations are invalid as a transfer of legislative authority to the executive.
See generally DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: HOW CONGRESS ABUSES THE
PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION (2002). Others seek to limit delegations or impose a higher level of judicial
review on agency actions. See e.g. Alex Forman, A Call to Restore Limitations on Unbridled
Congressional Delegations: American Trucking Ass’ns v. EPA, Note, 34 Ind. L. Rev. 1477, 1497 2001)
(“The Supreme Court should have adopted the nondelegation doctrine as a means of monitoring the
regulatory power of agencies, because it is consistent with constitutional norms as well as the doctrine’s
underlying principles.”).
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invalidate agency decisions.33 Congress, acting with the President, delegates decisionmaking authority to an agency; the President nominates the people to staff the agency; the
Senate confirms or rejects the nominee; and the courts are open for judicial review of
agency action. In theory, each actor is representative of and responsive to the American
public and the process is generally consistent with the Constitution’s formal requirements
and structural limitations. For domestic delegations, the benefits of agency expertise
come with agency costs, reduced by formal and informal review mechanisms.
The discussion here is certainly incomplete and does not provide an account of
the entire suite of tools available to Congress and the President. Its goal is to provide a
window into the formal and informal mechanisms and ex post and ex ante tools used to
constrain domestic agencies. It develops the framework to compare of the domestic and
international oversight mechanisms to reduce agency costs.

B.

International Delegations

The relatively straightforward account about the costs and benefits of delegations
changes, however, with respect international delegations. International delegations are the
transfer of executive, legislative or adjudicative decision-making authority to an
international organization, body, agency, panel or other entity. 34 With the significant
exception of the international component, they are conceptually identical to domestic
delegations. Consider the following modified example of a delegation of adjudicative
authority drawn from the North American Free Trade Area Agreement.35 The U.S.,
Canada and Mexico want to create a free trade zone encompassing each country and sign
a treaty to that effect. Under the terms of the treaty, the states create an adjudicative body
or appeals panel to hear potential claims regarding the treatment of companies operating
within the free trade zone. In this example, the U.S. has delegated adjudicative authority
to the international appeals panel created by the treaty to resolve claims arising under the
treaty; this transfer of authority is an international delegation.

33

See Cass Sunstein, Changing Conceptions of Administration, 1987 BYU L. REV. 927, 944-45 (1987)
(noting that regulatory choices are made “by officials subject to the control of a politically accountable
actor”); JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE: U.S.ING PUBLIC CHOICE TO IMPROVE
PUBLIC LAW 153 (1997) (arguing presidential control assures democratic responsiveness and
accountability).
34
See Bradley & Kelley, supra note 2, at 1 (describing the various types of international delegations);
Guzman & Landsidle, supra note 2 (questioning the proper definition of international delegations).
35
See North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 103-182, 101 Stat. 2057
(Dec. 8, 1993); Clinton Signs Nafta – December 8, 1993, THE MILLER CENTER: U. OF VA. (1993),
http://millercenter.org/academic/americanpresident/events/12_08; Demetrius Andreas Floudas & Luis
Fernando Rojas, Some Thoughts on NAFTA and Trade Integration in the American Continent, 52 INT’L
PROB. 371 (Dec. 2000).
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International delegations are either non-binding or binding.36 Nonbinding
international delegations assign decision-making authority to an international body, but
do not make the decisions of that body automatically enforceable within the delegating
state’s (the principal’s) legal system.37 using the highly simplified example above, the
appeals panel could issue judgments regarding claims brought under the treaty but, if the
delegation were nonbinding, the appeals panel’s judgments would not be immediately
enforceable or provide a rule of decision in U.S. courts. Some political branch action
(Congress and the President) would be necessary before those judgments have legal
effect in the U.S.
Nonbinding international delegations are generally not the source of the most
serious constitutional concerns because some political branch action is necessary before
any decision, judgment, or regulation becomes binding in the U.S..38 In other words,
Congress and the President would have to act before anything becomes enforceable in the
U.S. Presumably, the constitutional problems are minimal and the agency costs are low,
or at least similar to domestic delegations.
For some, the concerns about international delegations rise dramatically when the
U.S. transfers binding decision-making authority to an international entity.39 To illustrate
the point, imagine that the NAFTA appeals panel in the example above could hear claims
and its decisions would presumably be immediately enforceable in the U.S. After the
appeals panel issues its judgment, Congress and the President would not have the option
of noncompliance by refusing to act – the judgment would have immediate legal effect.
This resembles the operation of the NAFTA’s Article 19 Arbitration Panels discussed
below. For this reason, critics argue that binding international delegations are
constitutionally problematic and exacerbate agency costs.
The formal and structural constitutional problems are relatively straightforward.
Binding international delegations of legislative authority may conflict with Article I
procedural requirements for lawmaking40 and appointments.41 Typically, binding
36

See Guzman & Landsidle, supra note 2, at 1697-1701; Bradley & Kelley, supra note 2, at 4.
See Bradley & Kelley, id (concluding international delegations exist even when states give only
nonbinding power to issue resolutions, proposals, and opinions).
38
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 111(3) (“[A] ‘nonself-executing’ agreement will not be given effect as law in the absence of necessary implementation.”);
Curtis A. Bradley, International Delegations, The Structural Constitution, and Non-Self-Execution, 55
Stan. L. Rev. 1557, 1587 (2003) (discussing non-self-executing treaties and the requirement that they be
implemented by Congress before they override federal statutes and state laws and are enforceable in U.S.
courts).
39
Guzman & Landsidle, supra note 2, at 1697-1701 (considering definitions of international delegations);
John C. Yoo Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, and the Original
Understanding, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1955 (1999); Julian G. Ku The Delegation of Federal Power to
International Organizations: New Problems with Old Solutions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 71 (2000); John O.
McGinnis, Medellin and the Future of International Delegations, 118 YALE L.J. 1712, 1714 (2009)
40
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7; see Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 511 (2008) (rejecting that the ICJ decision
was binding based on the principle that “[t]he conduct of the foreign relations of our Government is
37
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international delegations are part of Article II treaties or congressional-executive
agreements that, by their terms, create an international body. Imagine the U.S. signs and
ratifies a multilateral treaty through the Article II treaty process (with the advice and
consent of a two-third’s majority of the Senate). The treaty creates an international body
that has binding authority to set minimum capital requirements for banks. The U.S., as
party to the treaty, has delegated the determination of capital requirements to an
international body. Subsequently, the body acts and determines that all parties to the
treaty must set the capital requirements for their domestic banks at 10 percent. Thus, the
U.S. has a binding obligation to comply with the new capital requirements.
For critics, this binding international delegation of legislative authority permits
the international body to create new “law” with respect to capital requirements in
violation of the Constitution’s bicameralism and presentment requirements.42 The
international body’s “legislation” would be automatically enforceable as U.S. law without
further political branch action, circumventing the House of Representatives, Senate and
President.
Similarly, a binding international delegation to an international agency would
implicate the Constitution’s Appointments Clause43 and potentially Article II
requirements for treaties.44 Imagine that the U.S. joins a multilateral treaty that creates an
international agency with the authority to set binding regulations for the permissible
amount of carbon emissions for each state party to the treaty. Therefore, the international
agency’s director and staff would have the authority to regulate the amount of carbon
emissions in the U.S. and their determination would have immediate legal effect in the
U.S..45
In this example, the director and staff of the international agency would not be
appointed by the President of the U.S. and confirmed by the Senate; she would be a
committed by the Constitution to the Executive and Legislative —‘the political’ — Departments”) (citing
Oerjten v. Central Leather Co., 246, U.S. 297, 302 (1918); Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 464
F.3d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (noting that if the future agreements made under the Montreal Protocol are law
then serious constitutional problems are raised by the delegation of Congress’s law making authority to an
international body).
41
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2-3; John C. Yoo, The New Sovereignty and the Old Constitution: The Chemical
Weapons Convention and the Appointments Clause, 15 CONST. COMMENTARY 87 (1998).
42
See Natural Resources Defense Council, 464 F.3d at 8 (discussing the enforceability of future
agreements); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989) (“Congress generally cannot delegate its
legislative power to another Branch.”); Ernest A. Young, The Trouble with Global Constitutionalism, 38
TEX. INT’L L.J. 527 (2003).
43
See footnote 41, supra.
44
See e.g., Bradley, supra note 38;; David M. Golove, The New Confederalism: Treaty Delegations of
Legislative, Executive, and Judicial Authority, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1697 (2003); Ku, supra note 39, at 121;
Yoo, supra note 41; Michael J. Glennon & Allison R. Hayward, Collective Security and the Constitution:
Can the Commander in Chief Power Be Delegated to the United Nations?, 82 GEO. L.J. 1573 (1994); Jim
C. Chen, Appointments with Disaster: The Unconstitutionality of Binational Arbitral Review Under the
United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1455 (1992).
45
See National Resource Defense Council, 464 F.3d 1.
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representative of the international agency and appointed consistent with the terms of the
treaty or the agency’s internal rules. This would seemingly violate the Appointments
Clause. Moreover, since the international agency can make ongoing binding
determinations regarding its area of regulatory authority—in this case carbon
emissions—such determinations could be interpreted as creating a new international
obligation for the U.S.. And, if it is a new international obligation for the U.S., it might
require a new treaty in conformance with the Treaty Clause.46
Perhaps the area of greatest concern for critics is binding delegations of
adjudicative authority to international judicial bodies.47 The treaties creating that United
Nations,48 the North American Free Trade Agreement49 and the World Trade
Organization,50 among others, each include a quasi-judicial body to hear claims arising
under each treaty. For example, NAFTA’s Article 19 Arbitration Panels51 hear claims and
issue judgments. Article 19 judgments provide a rule of decision enforceable in U.S.
courts, seemingly violating Article III limits on the delegations of judicial authority52 and
the Appointments Clause.53 The WTO’s appeals panel54 hears cases and issue binding
judgments, and the U.S. is party to several arbitral or claims agreements—for example,
the Iran/United States Claims Tribunal55—can issue binding decisions.

46

Id at 8 (noting that if the future agreements created under the Montreal Protocol are law then Congress
has “authorized amendment to a treaty without presidential signature or Senate ratification, in violation of
Article II of the Constitution).
47
In Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, petitioner argued that the United States was obligated to
comply with the Vienna Convention as interpreted by the ICJ. The petitioner argued the Court should
reconsider a previous holding because the ICJ had recently interpreted the Convention in the LaGrand and
Avena cases and reached an opposite conclusion. The Court rejected this proposition, stating the ICJ’s
interpretation deserves only “respectful consideration.” Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 352-53
(2006). See Medellin, 552 U.S. at 510 (“If ICJ judgments were instead regarded as automatically
enforceable domestic law, they would be immediately and directly binding on state and federal courts
pursuant to the Supremacy Clause.”); see also Mark L. Movesian, Judging International Judgments, 48 VA.
J. INT’L L. 65 (2007); Jenny S. Martinez, Towards an International Judicial System, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 429
(2003); McGinnis, supra note 39.
48
U.N. CHARTER, art 92 (designating the ICJ as the principal judicial organ of the U.N.).
49
NORTH AMERICA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT, art 19 (hereinafter NAFTA).
50
AGREEMENT ESTABLISHING THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, art. IV, § 3. Notably, the Appellate
Body that hears appeals from panel reports brought by WTO Members was established in 1995 under
Article 17 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes.
51
NAFTA, art 19.
52
U.S. CONST. art III, §§ 1-2.
53
U.S. CONST. art II, § 2.
54
URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENT: MARRAKESH AGREEMENT ESTABLISHING THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION (MARRAKESH AGREEMENT), Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes, art 17. For examples of Appellate Body reports, see United States – Standards for
Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, Report of the Appellate Body WT/DS2/AB/R 1, 22–23 (April
29, 1996); Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, Report of the Appellate Body,
WT/DS332/AB/R ¶ 179 (Dec 3, 2007).
55
The Iran – United States Claims Tribunal was established in the Algiers Accords. Undertakings of the
Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran with
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The International Court of Justice,56 the legal arm of the United Nations, can hear claims
arising under the Charter and international law generally with the consent of the state
parties. In a series of cases concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations,57
the ICJ concluded that the U.S. was in violation of the convention for failing to provide
foreign nationals in police custody with access to their respective consulates.58
Subsequently, the Supreme Court considered whether the ICJ decisions were “selfexecuting” and entitled to immediate legal effect in the U.S..59 Though the Court held
that the structure of the U.N. Charter and the absence of definitive language demonstrated
that ICJ decisions were “non-self-executing,”60 concern about the ability of foreign courts
to impose international law in the U.S. without U.S. political branch action increased.61
Beyond formal constitutional requirements, binding international delegations
implicate general federalism62 and separation of powers63 concerns. Federalism64
envisions certain limits on the national government that will be lost if international
institutions can make decisions, issue regulatory directives or resolve legal claims that are
binding in the U.S.65 And, even if the President can represent U.S. interests at the
Respect to the Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, Algiers
Accords (January 19, 1981)
56
U.N. CHARTER, art 92; Dispute Settlement: General Topics, 1.2 International Court of Justice, United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development 11 (2003) (listing the types of jurisdiction the ICJ holds
including contentious jurisdiction in which the States submit the dispute by consent for a binding decision).
57
LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466 (Judgment of June 27); Case Concerning Avena and
other Mexican Nationals (Mex. V. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. No. 128 (Judgment of Mar. 31).
58
Lagrand, 2001 I.C.J. at 497 ¶¶ 90-91; Avena, 2004 I.C.J. No. 128, at ¶¶ 63, 76.
59
Medellin, 552, U.S. at 508.
60
Id (“We agree with this construction of Article 94. The Article is not a directive to domestic courts. It
does not provide that the United States “shall” or “must” comply with an ICJ decision, nor indicate that the
Senate that ratified the U.N. Charter intended to vest ICJ decisions with immediate legal effect in domestic
courts.”).
61
For an overview of the debate regarding the Court’s legal reasoning in Medellin and the future of selfexecution treaty cases, see Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Treaties as Law of the Land: The Supremacy Clause
and the Judicial Enforcement of Treaties, 122 HARV. L. REV. 599 (2008) (criticizing Medellin’s selfexecution analysis); Curtis A. Bradley, Self-Execution and Treaty Duality, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 131
(supporting the self-execution analysis); see also David H. Moore, Law(makers) of the Land: The Doctrine
of Treaty Non-Self-Execution, 122 HARV. L. REV. F. 32 (2009).
62
See Neil S. Siegel, International Delegations and the Values of Federalism, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
93, 100-06 (2008).
63
See e.g., LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 272 (2d ed. 1996);
Neil Kinkopf, Of Devolution, Privatization, and Globalization: Separation of Powers Limits on
Congressional Authority to Assign Federal Power to Non-Federal Actors, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 331 (1998);
Ku, supra note 39, at 121; Yoo, supra note 41.
64
Siegel, supra note 62, at 96-99 (“A federal system entails a vertical division of regulatory authority
between the national government and subnational states. . . . [A] powerful check on the abuse of
government power is said to exist when multiple levels of government compete for regulatory authority and
political power is diffused.”).
65
See id at 101 (“Turning to the other federalism values discussed above, international delegations likely
undermine all of them to the extent that such delegations reduce state regulatory control, as opposed to
leaving state control unchanged and just reducing national control.”); see also Curtis A. Bradley, The
Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 MICH. L. REV. 390 (1998).
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international institutions—perhaps addressing some accountability concerns—the transfer
of decision-making authority away from Congress and the states to the President
encourages a consolidation of power in the executive branch.66 For critics, binding
international delegations conflict with the Constitution’s formal limits67 and traditional
separation of powers and federalism concerns.
The failure to conform to formal and structural constitutional limitations produces
a second and perhaps larger problem with binding international delegations: a lack of
democratic legitimacy and political accountability for those entities exercising delegated
authority.68 For critics, international institutions are not exclusively or even
predominantly accountable or responsive to the American interests.69 They are only
accountable to the states that created them: the U.S. and the dozens of other member
states (the joint principals) that comprise the international institution’s membership. In
the domestic context, at least Congress, the President, and the courts can proscribe
delegations to administrative agencies, and monitor their behavior. In the international
context, this oversight structure cannot be replicated. Thus, agency costs are low (or
lower) in domestic delegations and higher in international delegations. In effect,
delegations to domestic agencies are the ideal type: they are constrained by a U.S.
principal subject to the American political process. Whatever agency costs problems exist
in the domestic context, they pale in comparison to the costs created by delegating
binding authority to an international institution.

66

Golove has described the concerns of some scholars that international delegations are antidemocratic and
lack the necessary accountability to the American people. Golove, supra note 44, at 1699-1700; see
Edward T. Swaine, The Constitutionality of International Delegations, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1492, 1540
(2004) (noting that although the U.S. retains a veto on the U.N. security council, that power is held by the
executive branch officials and “Congress still loses control”); Bradley, supra note 38, at 1559-60 (“Most
typically, these transfers may increase the relative power of the executive branch, both because they often
delegate the powers of other branches, and because the United States is represented in these institutions by
executive branch agents.”); cf. Ku, supra note 39 (arguing the courts should apply formalist principles to
see whether international delegations are constitutional because formalism, rather than functionalism,
ensures accountability).
67
U.S. CONST. art II, § 2, cl. 2.2 (Appointments Clause); U.S. CONST. art II, § 2, cl. 2.1 (Treaty Clause);
U.S. CONST. art I, § 7, cl 2-3 (Presentment Clause). Article I of the Constitution also provides for
bicameralism.
68
See Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch & Richard B. Stewart, The Emergence of Global Administrative
Law, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15, 26 (2005) (“In our view, international lawyers can no longer
credibly argue that there are no real democracy or legitimacy deficits in global administrative governance. .
. . “); Ruth W. Grant & Robert O. Keohane, Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics, 99 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 29, 37 (2005) (conceding there is a lack of democratic accountability of international
bodies); cf Bradley, supra note 38, at 1558 (noting the lack of transparency in international decisionmaking may increase accountability concerns).
69
Swaine, supra note 66, at 1601-02 (“International delegations give power to officials and institutions that
‘are not accountable, directly or indirectly, exclusively to the American electorate,’ and indeed may not be
accountable to much of anyone at all.”); Ku, supra note 39, at 125 (concluding it is the characteristics of
evolving international organization that make them unaccountable entities within the U.S.).
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Given the apparent constitutional concerns and high agency costs, what should be
done? Since the U.S. continues to delegate both non-binding and binding authority to
international institutions, scholars have focused on the ex ante national constitutional
design mechanisms to regulate all international delegations and limit binding
international delegations. The section examines those proposals.

II.

CRITIQUING PROPOSALS TO LIMIT INTERNATIONAL DELEGATIONS
A.

Raising the Enactment Costs of Binding International Delegations

The combination of formal constitutional concerns and high agency costs has
motivated proposals to make binding international delegations more difficult and, as a
consequence, infrequent. How do critics purport to solve the problems created by binding
international delegations? Three proposals are of particular prominence.70 They either
endorse the adoption of interpretive tools to effectively create a non-self execution
default rule for all treaties and congressional-executive agreements that make
international delegations or, alternatively, create a process rule to force all binding
international delegations to go through the Article II treaty process.
One proposal suggests that courts should adopt a default rule of non selfexecution for all international delegations that purport to create a commitment or
obligation for the U.S..71 Thus, if the U.S. wants to create a binding legal obligation,
Congress and the President must specifically indicate an intent to bind the U.S. in the
congressional-executive agreement or treaty that purports to make the international
delegation. The proposal rests on both formal constitutional grounds outlined in Section I.
Another justification rests on additional consequentialist concerns, namely that
“[i]nternational delegations, by potentially binding the United States ex ante to rules and
decisions it has not specifically approved, may in fact reduce the case-by-case flexibility
often thought important in foreign affairs.”72 Binding international delegations are
constitutionally problematic, create accountability problems, and constrain the U.S. in
international politics.
A similar proposal suggests that the U.S. adopt a “super-strong clear statement
rule,” presumably requiring Congress and the President to explicitly state their intent to
73

70

Another proposal draws from the administrative structure of domestic delegations and endorses the
creation of an “Administrative Procedures Act for foreign affairs delegations to limit the President’s
discretion. See Oona A. Hathaway, Presidential Power Over International Law: Restoring the Balance,
119 YALE L. J. 140, 219-24, 239-41 (2009) (proposing administrative law principles for a portion of
international law issues and limitations of broad foreign affairs delegations to the executive).
71
See John C. Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking: A Textual and Structural Defense of Non-SelfExecution, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2218, 2254-57 (1999) (arguing for a rule in which treaties are not selfexecuting unless lawmakers explicitly state so).
72
Bradley, supra note 38, at 1585.
73
Julian G. Ku, International Delegations and the New World Court Order, 81 WASH. L. REV. 1, 7 (2006).
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bind the U.S. through an international delegation of adjudicatory authority.74 In the
absence of a “super-strong” clear statement, courts would treat judgments of international
legal tribunals as non-self executing and would not create any binding legal obligation in
the U.S.. Though it is not entirely how courts would distinguish between a clear
statement rule and a “super-strong clear statement rule,”75 this proposal is designed to
make binding international delegations of adjudicative authority significantly more
difficult and limit the binding effect of judgments from international judicial tribunal.
A third option proposes to “raise the costs of enacting”76 binding international
delegations by requiring that such delegations be made only through the Article II treaty
process.77 The Treaty Clause’s supermajority requirement would have the effect of
prohibiting binding international delegations through congressional-executive
agreements, which like domestic legislation go through both houses of Congress and are
signed by the President, and through presidential-executive agreements, negotiated and
signed by the President without congressional involvement.78 Among other things, the
proposal is framed as a compromise between a permissive regime79 that allows binding
international delegations without additional limitations and a prohibitory regime80 that
restricts them outright. Though they vary slightly, each of these proposals represents a
constitutionally inspired limit to binding international delegations. Most important, the
proposals are concerned with the same problems, namely a lack of formal adherence to
constitutional limitations and structural requirements, combined with the high agency
costs from poor accountability and legitimacy.
At this point, one might note a tension between the formalist limitations endorsed
by critics of international delegations and functionalist justifications invoked in this
Article. Critics are concerned with lack of conformance with constitutional requirements
that will result in high agency costs, while this Article focuses on the reduction of agency
costs through oversight mechanisms. But despite the critics’ contention that binding
international delegations are inconsistent with the Constitution, none of the proposals
fully embraces formalism they espouse and prohibits all binding international
delegations. Rather, they explicitly attempt to limit binding international delegations on
74

Id.
Ku argues a super-strong clear statement could come from implementing legislation or in the language of
the treaty itself. He notes the Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations does not
contain a sufficiently clear statement, which states “Disputes arising out of the interpretation or application
of the Convention shall lie within the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. . . .”
Under Ku’s analysis a super-strong clear statement might discuss the mechanisms of domestic enforcement
or specific standards for U.S. courts to follow when enforcing international judgments, but it is unclear
exactly when a clear statement becomes a super-strong clear statement. Id. 62-63
76
McGinnis, supra note 39, at 1715.
77
Id at 1742.
78
Id at 1747 (“because it is the treaty power that uniquely authorizes international delegations, a
congressional-executive agreement would not be sufficient.”).
79
Id at 1736 (describing the categorical permission model).
80
Id.
75
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functionalist grounds, namely concerns about agency costs. Thus, the debate really
centers on whether the potential for high agency costs justifies limitations on binding
international delegations, and this Article attempts to answer that question.
Since the U.S. has and will continues to delegate authority to international institutions
and there is no reason to think that this trend will stop, international delegations will
likely remain a tool for the U.S. as the international community deals with challenges of
global concern. If this characterization of the future of international delegations is
accurate, is there an alternative basis for limiting international delegations? Each of the
proposals outlined above argue that binding international delegations create serious
problems related to democratic deficit, legitimacy or accountability; in other words, they
create high agency costs. And these costs are high enough to warrant some limit on
binding delegations. Given this link, it is important to evaluate the agency costs claim.

B.

Specification of Agency Costs

Critics of binding international delegations implicitly evaluate these delegations
through the same lens that they apply to domestic delegations: they look to formal
constitutional requirements and the agency costs from lack of political accountability.
Since the oversight mechanisms available in domestic delegations to agencies are
unavailable for international delegations to unaccountable international institutions, they
argue that additional procedural constraints are necessary to make it harder for the U.S. to
delegate binding authority.
The key justification for limits on international delegations is the presence of high
agency costs. However, the lack of specificity in the claim regarding agency costs and
lack of clarity regarding assumptions about the incentives of international institutions
creates doubt on the need for limits on binding international delegations. Let’s begin with
a consideration of agency costs.

1.

Defining and Measuring High Agency Costs

First, critics are not always clear about the empirical or normative baseline on
what constitutes high agency costs.81 It appears that they are making a comparative claim
about the nature of agency costs in domestic and international delegations and concluding
that the increase in scale in the international context necessarily means high agency costs.
But even with a comparative claim, we still need more guidance about what agency cost
“threshold” that international delegations must cross to warrant the significant
81

See McGinnis, supra note 39, at 1714 (“[D]elegations raise dramatic problems of agency costs, because
international agents’ work is less transparent and less subject to control than domestic agents’ work.”). T.
Alexander Aleinikoff, Thinking Outside the Sovereignty box: Transnational Law and the U.S. Constitution,
82 Tex. L. REv. 1989, 2002 (2004).

18

constitutional limits that they endorse. Even if we assume that critics are most concerned
about agency costs in the comparative context, we would expect agency costs to vary
according to the nature of the international delegation (legislative, judicial, or
regulatory);82 the organizational structure of the body exercising decision-making
authority;83 the issue over which the organization has authority,84 and the scope of
domestic interference. But we would also expect the same thing in domestic delegations
as well. Agency costs likely vary with respect to the type, scope, issue area of the
domestic delegation; and the institutional design, internal procedures and decisionmaking processes of domestic agencies. To even begin a serious comparison of agency
costs in the domestic and international context would require some consideration of these
factors, among many others.
Second, it is not clear why agency costs are necessarily always higher in
international delegations than domestic delegations. Consider this simple example. The
U.S. signs a multilateral treaty with three small countries creating limits on the
expropriation of foreign property. The treaty creates an eleven judge “International
Expropriation Court” (“IEC”) with binding adjudicative authority to hear claims and
issue final judgments; it is a binding international delegation by the U.S. to the IEC
through a treaty. Agency costs, in theory, might be high since the U.S. cannot control the
International Expropriation Court’s judgments, as they would be automatically
enforceable in U.S. courts.
However, let’s assume further that the treaty requires that the IEC operate by
majority vote for all decisions but permits the U.S. to appoint six of the eleven judges.
With this majority, the U.S. would have control of how the IEC will dispose of all claims,
including those relating to American interests. Here, agency costs are low because the
IEC’s voting structure ensures that it would reflect U.S. interests. The purpose of this
example is to show that agency costs are much harder to assess and that a simple
international/domestic distinction might not be determinative. In fact, depending on the
agency, the agency costs in a domestic delegation might very well be higher than a
binding international delegation of adjudicative authority.
82

See Siegel, supra note 62, at 95 (noting that the implications of international delegations vary based on
whether the delegation merely transfers a regulatory power that would otherwise be exercised by the
federal government or if the international delegation creates legislation that would not otherwise be
promulgated by the federal government); Judith L. Goldstein & Richard H. Steinberg, Negotiate or
Litigate? Effects of WTO Judicial Delegation on U.S. Trade Politics, 71 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 257, 257
(2008) (noting the surprising amount of judicial lawmaking that has occurred under the WTO when the
same action would face domestic resistance).
83
See Barbara Koremenos, When, What, and Why Do States Choose to Delegate?, 71 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS 151, 174-77 (2008) (noting the design of a treaty or organization will influence the degree states’
choose to delegate).
84
See Oona Hathaway, International Delegation and State Sovereignty, 71 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 115,
141-45 (2008) (arguing that international delegations of authority on a variety of issues create significant
benefits that cannot be achieved absent delegation).
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Third, critics are unclear about the identity of the principal for international
delegations.85 At the highest level of generality, the principal might be the American
people and the claim would be that the international organization is unlikely to be
responsive their collective will. However, it is Congress, not the American people, which
delegates authority. Congress, therefore, could be the principal. But, when Congress acts,
it is reflecting the view of the enacting coalition, along with the President, for the treaty
or congressional agreement that creates the specific international delegation. Without
greater specification of the principal, it is hard to assess the agency cost claim in the
international context.
Finally, critics do not explain why they think that international institutions would
be more vulnerable than domestic agencies to agency costs stemming from agency drift,86
coalition drift87 or interest group capture,88 creating high agency costs, than domestic
agencies. Of course, the U.S. might delegate binding authority to an international
institution today that, over time, might expand the scope of its authority beyond the initial
delegation, become beholden to interest groups, or develop interests separate and
independent from the states which create it. These are certainly legitimate concerns but it
is unclear why the agency costs that theses issues generate are significantly higher in the
domestic context.

2.

Incentives of International Institutions

The problems with under specification also exist with respect to the
characterization of international institutions exercising delegated authority. Critics are
unclear about the basis for their assumptions about the structure and strategic incentives
of international institutions. Though they are not always explicit, assumptions about
international institutions and their relationship to the U.S. drive much of the concern
about agency costs.
As an initial matter, it is difficult to know ex ante with any certainty the likely
structure, procedural rules and decision-making processes of the international institutions
that might exercise binding authority. The issue, type and scope of the delegation have
consequences for the internal structure of the international institution, making general
claims more speculative. Despite these problems, a few assumptions about the operation
of international institutions seem to motivate the criticism of international delegations.
85

See fn 7 (describing the lack of clarity on who exactly constitutes the principal in the domestic setting –
Congress as a whole or the individual committees).
86
McCubbins, Noll, & Weingast, supra note 7 at 443-44.
87
Shepsle, supra note 10, at 114-15 (discussing how coalition drift might result when legislative or
presidential preferences change).
88
Jonathan R. Macey, Separated Power and Positive Political Theory: The Tug of War Over
Administrative Agencies, 80 GEO. L.J. 671, 702 (1992) (arguing the Supreme Court’s rules of standing are a
response to the problem of interest group capture of administrative agencies).

20

One clear assumption is that international institutions are staffed with
cosmopolitan foreign elites who are either dismissive of or openly hostile to American
interests.89 These elites will naturally reflect the interests of their respective states and, so
the argument goes, their interests will clash with American priorities. In principal-agent
terms, there are many joint principals with conflicting preferences for the agent’s
behavior. Thus, the international institution is an aggregation of people who, on average,
will not have American interests in mind. Since these foreign elites will be exercising
binding decision-making authority, the agency costs of international delegations are high.
A variant of this assumption is that international institutions (and international
law) are tools to constrain American power, making them unlikely to represent American
interests.90 Since the U.S. has a predominant role in international politics, other states
cannot compete through economic, political or military means. Instead, states want to
enmesh the U.S. in a web of international organizations, tribunals and agencies to limit
the U.S.’s ability to influence world affairs.91 If the U.S. transfers binding authority to
international institutions that operate as tools for weaker states to constrain the U.S., the
agency costs are likely to be high.
While it is certainly true that international institutions will not perfectly reflect
U.S. interests and that weaker states might try and use them to constrain the U.S., it also
clear that the U.S. has been the leading force in the conception, creation and Use of
international institutions across a number of issue areas.92 The most salient international
institutions in world affairs, the United Nations and the World Trade Organization, are
both the results of U.S. efforts to shape the world consistent with U.S. interests. In fact,
for reasons discussed earlier, the U.S. is unlikely to ever delegate binding decisionmaking authority to international institutions that it cannot influence or control. Rather
than being constrained by international institutions, the U.S. is generally delegating to an
international institutions that it created and over which it likely exercises disproportionate
influence. The U.S. is likely to be the dominant principal for an agent that it designed and
controls.
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C.

The Potential Benefits of Binding International Delegations

Critics of binding international delegations focus almost exclusively on the
agency costs problem but do not weigh those costs against the benefits of international
delegations.93 In fact, there is generally only passing reference to the potential benefits, if
at all of, greater international cooperation. But any analysis of the virtues of binding
international delegations would have to consider both sides of the ledger—costs and
benefits—to support any claim that the agency costs are sufficient to warrant restrictions
delegations. Rather than engaging in this analysis, critics essentially provide a one-sided,
agency cost-driven analysis.
While is it beyond the scope of this Article to provide a comprehensive analysis
of costs and benefits, it is uncontroversial to suggest that there are challenges of global
concern requiring international cooperation to address and that international delegations
may be one way to exploit the organizational advantages of centralized international
institutions. Some international issues have clear spillover effects that can be most
effectively addressed on the international level. For example, the recent world financial
crisis has increased calls for greater harmonization of financial and economic
regulation;94 the increasing evidence about the consequences of climate change has led to
numerous attempts by the international community to expand the Kyoto Protocol95 and
reduce carbon emissions;96 and the attacks of September 11 in the U.S. and other
bombings in the United Kingdom and Spain have resulted in greater cooperation in the
UNSC on international terrorism, its funding and organization. This list is not
comprehensive but it suggests that any determination of agency costs must be weighed
against how the benefits of successful coordination on these issues, and many others,
might redound to the U.S.
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Similar to domestic agencies in the U.S., international institutions can take
advantage of the aggregation of human expertise, broader access to data, greater
legitimacy and the accumulation of institutional knowledge built up over time to address
the issues of global concern.97 International institutions with standing committees, bodies
or executive structures can act more rapidly to address global issues as they occur, rather
than waiting for states to coordinate or act independently in a crisis. Much of this can be
done at a lower cost through an international institution with decision-making authority
rather than by state coordination on a bilateral or multilateral basis; on an issue-by-issue
basis; or in a reactive, ad hoc manner. Limits on the national government’s ability to
delegate binding authority might make it harder for the U.S. to enjoy the gains of
international cooperation in the situation where the gains outweigh the potential agency
costs.
The general or long-term benefits for the U.S. to have the flexibility of delegating
binding authority to international institutions—without procedural constraints—are more
speculative but important. International relations scholars differ on the value of
international institutions.98 Some think that they have an independent effect on state
behavior and are therefore capable of shaping state interests,99 while others find them as
tools of the states that created them.100 In the absence of a clear answer on this issue, it is
unwise to create national constitutional design rules that limit the ability of the U.S. to
delegate to international institutions and narrow the U.S.’s foreign affairs options.
One prominent theory suggests that after conflict the U.S. has historically
designed international institutions with the goal of locking-in an existing legal or
“constitutional” order of international governance—one that reflects the economic,
political, and national security interests of the U.S.—in advance of the U.S.’s inevitable
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decline in power relative to other states.101 By creating the rules of international politics
when it is a hegemon, the U.S. is effectively “hedging” against future changes in the
distribution of power in international politics. For example, after World War II, the U.S.
created the U.N., the IMF, the World Bank, among other institutions, at the peak of its
relative power with the hope that, as Europe and Asia were rebuilding in the mid
twentieth century, they would enter an existing structure of international governance.
This would deter challenges to the U.S.-crafted political and economic order.
Now, with the rise of China, India, Brazil and other developing countries the
U.S.’s incentives to hedge or lock-in the existing order, which it still dominates, might be
stronger. International institutions could be tools for the U.S. to try to contain rising
countries in a multilateral web of international governance and maintain its influence on
international politics, even as its economic and military power recedes. If this is accurate,
then raising the costs of enacting international delegations might be counter-productive.
The point of this discussion is not to endorse any long-term strategy to Use
international delegations and international institutions for U.S. foreign policy purposes.
Rather, it shows that the benefits of international delegations—both with respect to
specific issues of global concern and broader U.S. foreign policy goals—might outweigh
the agency costs associated with them. At the very least, claims that high agency costs
justify making binding international delegations more difficult requires a deeper
evaluation of their potential benefits.

III.

TOOLS

FROM

DOMESTIC DELEGATIONS AVAILABLE

FOR INTERNATIONAL

DELEGATIONS
This Article argues that many of the oversight tools for domestic delegations are
available and Used in the international context, a point frequently ignored by critics of
international delegations. What are the domestic tools? And are they available and
effective for the U.S. for international delegations? This section outlines those tools and
their international analogs. The analysis suggests that agency costs in international
delegations may not be as high as critics assume and do not justify raising the enactment
costs of such delegations. It also outlines some of the oversight tools unique to the
international environment.
As discussed in Section I, the ex ante domestic oversight mechanisms include the
appointments process, in which Congress and the President can designate loyal agency
heads to ensure that the agency acts within their delegated authority, and the use of
procedural constraints on the agency, including requiring the use of specific decisionmaking methodologies or explicit agenda-setting. Still others tool focus on institutional
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design to limit discretion and constrain the agencies or requirements to use specific
decision-making methodologies.
After the agency begins exercising decision-making authority, Congress can use
its appropriations power to limit the capacity of the agency to act, it can provide for
greater judicial review of agency rulemaking and, perhaps most important, it can set up
committees to monitor agency activities through police patrols and fire alarms. Finally,
the President can narrow agency discretion through explicit directives, intra-executive
supervision and the assumption of responsibility for agency actions. All of these tools
permit the principal to reduce agency slack and limit shirking and self-dealing by the
agent.
Many of these ex ante and ex post tools are present, in slightly different from, in
the international context. Of course, the argument here is not that the international
oversight tools perfectly mimic those in the domestic context, making agency costs
exactly the same. Rather, the argument is that any claim that agency costs are sufficiently
high to warrant constitutional redress fails without a closer examination of the various
tools that the U.S. uses to influence international institutions. Understanding the full set
of options available to mitigate agency costs also requires an examination of both ex ante
and ex post tools, something that critics underplay in concluding that international
delegations are problematic.
Some might argue that even if agency costs in international delegations are high,
the number of international delegations by states that include actual binding authority is
small,102 ameliorating any concerns. But this misses two key points. First, it is clear that
the most pressing problems of global concern require international cooperation. It is also
clear that states have turned to international institutions as the entity to aggregate
information, facilitate decision-making and implement solutions. This is the story of the
late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries and the U.S. has been the chief protagonist
in it. States have and will continue to delegate authority to international institutions and
this trend will likely increase over time. If this premise is correct, it is important to focus
on the U.S. and the oversight mechanisms that might exist to reduce agency costs in
international delegations. This Article, in contrast to the extant literature, looks to U.S.
domestic delegations to better understand the monitoring and oversight tools available.
By engaging in this analysis, it is easier to evaluate the implications of international
delegations for U.S. domestic law and the logic of constitutionally inspired limitations.
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Second, as a practical matter some international delegations might be important
even if they are not binding. For example, we can imagine logrolling within an
international institution. The U.S. might be willing to support initiatives that it does not
like in exchange for support on issues that are particularly important. And since
international institutions reduce the transactions costs related to international cooperation,
the U.S. will naturally accept some limits on its ability to act unilaterally on an issue in
order to ensure that other states “buy-in” to the broader structure of the international
institution, one that generally reflects U.S. interests. Even if the U.S. has substantial
control of an international institution, one can still imagine situations in which the U.S.
loses the battle on a specific initiative in order to win the war of keeping states committed
to an organizational structure that the U.S. created. Thus, the international delegation can
have consequences for the U.S., making a deeper understanding of the oversight tools a
particularly important inquiry.
Of course, it is hard to predict, ex ante, the specific structure of the international
institution that would exercise binding decision-making authority.103 It is thus difficult to
make definitive claims about the presence of high agency costs in binding international
delegations or the need to limit them. But we can get traction on these questions by
looking at the current structure of international institutions to which the U.S. has
delegated non-binding authority and draw inferences about the possible structure of
institutions that might exercise binding authority. If those international institutions
exercising non-binding authority have internal structures that provide the U.S. with
significant influence and control—and keep agency costs down—we can imagine how
the U.S. would structure the international institutions to which it might delegate binding
authority. Since the stakes are much higher in the latter context, the U.S. is even more
likely to try and ensure that the international institution is accountable to American
interests. This becomes clear when viewing how the U.S. exercises its political, military
and economic influence to shape the design and internal operation of international
institutions. Broadly speaking, the United States has the unique capacity to influence the
activities of international organizations and ensure greater accountability than the critics
of international delegations generally assume. The U.S., for all intents and purposes, is
the dominant principal in the world’s most important international institutions. The list
below describes a few of the tools available to the U.S.
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A.

Ex Ante Oversight Tools for International Delegations

As you might imagine, the claims about the U.S.’s ability to Use ex ante tools
derives from theories of international relations and their predictions regarding
international institutions: who creates the institutions, how they operate, and how they
enforce their policies, rules or decisions. International institutions are generally
conceived, designed and operated by powerful states to allow them to coordinate and
achieve shared goals.104 At the same time, the international relations literature on rational
constitutional design also generates hypotheses about structuring international institutions
to meet certain goals, increase flexibility and even shape state interests.105 If such options
exist, the claim that the difference in agency costs between international and domestic
delegations, by itself, justifies disparate constitutional treatment is less convincing. In the
end, the capacity of the U.S. to influence the international institution will depend on the
nature of the delegation; the decision-making procedures of the institution; the
substantive area (pollution, chemical weapons, human rights); and the precision of the
rule adopted106 (hard law or soft law). The purpose of this discussion is to demonstrate
that many of the domestic oversight mechanisms in domestic delegations are also
available to the U.S. in the international context. So what are the tools that the U.S., as
the principal, can use to reduce agency slack?
The most effective ex ante tools center on institutional design and procedures,
namely agenda setting, attenuated delegation, voting rules (weighted voting and veto
powers); appointments and funding. The U.S. has been the founder and key member of
the most significant international institutions in the world today including the United
Nations,107 the IMF, the World Bank, GATT and the World Trade Organization,108
among others. Given the U.S.’s prominence in world affairs, the U.S. has been able to
design the international institution with its interests in mind, making them more
accountable to its wishes. This section provides examples of some of these ex ante tools
in the operation of the U.N., the World Bank, the IMF, and the WTO. It is not, by any
means, a comprehensive discussion of all the mechanisms that the U.S. has at its disposal
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to monitor international institutions. It also does not touch upon every single international
entity to which the U.S. has delegated either binding or non-binding authority.
Attenuated Delegation. For many international institutions, the U.S. has created
“majority rule” decision-making processes on some issues, while reserving the most
important issues to smaller entities within the institution. In essence, the U.S. has
delegated general authority to the international institution and, within the institution, it
has ensured that specific authority has been delegated to a smaller subgroup that
exercises true decision-making authority. For example, the United Nations has 192
members and each has one vote at the UN General Assembly. But for the most important
issues regarding the “maintenance of international peace and security,”109 the UN is
structured such that the UNGA, in effect, delegates decision-making authority to the
United Nations Security Council.110 The UNSC has only 15 members at any given time, 5
of which are permanent and possess a veto: the United States, China, Great Britain, China
and Russia.111 With the veto power, the U.S. can block any potential UNSC resolution
that conflicts with U.S. interests or those of its allies, For the key security issues of
international politics, the U.N.’s 192 members do not have the bulk of the influence; it is
really an institution of five. The agency costs, such as they are, will likely be reduced in
this structure.
The World Bank and the IMF also have smaller subgroups that exercise true
decision-making authority. Though the World Bank has 187 member states,112 the real
power remains with the 25 person executive board, 5 of which are nominated by the U.S.,
Germany, France, Japan and the United Kingdom, and with the President of the World
Bank who has always been an American.113 The IMF also has 187 member states but real
power for major decisions is lodged with the 24 directors on the executive board, with 5
of the directors representing the same 5 countries listed above.114 Even this superficial
109
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overview of the decision-making structure of both institutions suggests that the U.S. has
structured the IMF and the World Bank to try and ensure American control and, as a
consequence, reduce agency costs. Just as in the domestic context, the U.S. has tools to
monitor and oversee international institutions.
Voting Rules. The U.S.’s outsize influence through attenuated delegations in the
U.N., the IMF and WTO is exacerbated by their voting rules. Most international
institutions are not democratic in their voting procedures and reflect a disproportionate
influence for the U.S. well beyond the size of its population.115 For example, the U.S. has
a veto and permanent seat on the UNSC;116 though the U.S. cannot force resolutions
through the UNSC due to the presence of other veto powers, it can prevent the UNSC
from acting contrary to U.S. interests. At the IMF, the U.S. has an approximately 16
percent weighted vote at an institution that requires a consensus of 85 percent for major
decisions and amendments,117 and virtually the same structure exists at the World Bank.
In fact, the biggest criticism of both the World Bank and the IMF is the effective veto that
the U.S. has over any major decisions.118 The political science literature on the IMF and
the World Bank finds that, overall, they have been effective agents for the interests of
their principal, the U.S.119 If anything, these international institutions are actually
uniquely responsive to U.S. interests rather than unaccountable to the American public.
Though much of the literature on the WTO focuses on its dispute resolution
mechanism,120 the WTO’s consensus decision-making structure ensures that the
developed countries, including the U.S., have disproportionate influence over outcomes.
Although each member state has a vote, virtually all decisions by the WTO are taken by
consensus, meaning “if no member present at the meeting when the decision is formally
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taken, formally objects to the proposed decisions.”121 As a consequence, the ability of the
WTO’s member states—and their respective delegates—to attend and participate in
meetings is of particular importance in shaping the agenda, negotiations and decisionmaking at the WTO.122
But, unsurprisingly, developing countries do not have the staff or resources to follow and
actively participate in the WTO’s decision-making. The WTO has five rounds of
meetings123 over multiple issue areas ranging from the effect of nontariff measures on
small economies to trade finance reform each year. While the developed countries have
the resources to participate, the U.S., Japan and Germany, for example, have fortyseven124 delegates working full time at the WTO, some forty-five countries have fewer
than three.125 Moreover, some of the delegates from developing countries are not only
tasked with responsibility at the WTO’s headquarters in Geneva but also represent their
respective states at the half dozen other international institutions also located in the
city.126 In effect, it is hard for developing countries to participate in the WTO’s decisionmaking structure, while easier for wealthier, developed countries like the U.S. to
influence outcomes. Again, the WTO shrinks from an international institution with 153
member states to one in which a small number exercises real power.127
Appointments. The U.S. also has influence over the appointment and termination
of top officials at many international institutions.128 In agency cost terms, the U.S. has
tried to ensure that agency heads are not too far removed from American interests. One
unobservable way in which the U.S. influences international institutions is by shaping the
decision-making of other states. If a state knows that the U.S. is likely to look
121
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unfavorably on a potential nominee, that state will be less willing to nominate the person
in the first place. U.S. preferences frame the breadth of decision-making options for other
states. But there are observable factors as well. The U.S. single-handedly blocked the reappointment of Boutros-Boutros Ghali as U.N. Secretary General in 1996,129 by
exercising its veto power on the UNSC despite losing the UNSC vote 1-14.130 In casting
this vote, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright stated that the U.S. was dissatisfied with
his leadership and wanted a new direction at the U.N., regardless of the level of his
support in the international community.131 When the UNSC authorizes the Use of force,
the U.S. also insists that all American troops acting on behalf of the U.N. only serve
under an American commander, even though the U.S. is acting under U.N. auspices.132
At the World Bank, the U.S. not only has an effective veto power over major decisions
but also unilaterally names the President of the World Bank,133 inevitably an American
who will likely shape the direction of the international institution to pursue U.S. interests.
Even this simple discussion of four of the world’s most prominent international
institutions demonstrates that the U.S. implemented many ex ante tools to try and ensure
that the international institutions to which it has delegated non-binding authority remain
effective agents for their principal, the U.S. But this is not the limit of the U.S.’s capacity
to influence international institutions and reduce agency costs; just as the domestic
delegations context, the U.S. has several ex post tools as well.

B.

Ex Post Oversight Tools for International Delegations

The U.S.’s predominance in international politics also allows it to use a set of ex
post tools that are conceptually similar to those available in the domestic context. They
range from funding international institutions, side payments to states and conditions on
foreign aid, to provisional participation, withdrawal and the creation of new international
institutions. While they might be more costly for the U.S.—withdrawal from an
international institution or the creation of a new one is not easy—these tools are available
to the U.S. and the U.S., on occasion, has utilized them. But, if the U.S.’s participation in
129
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the international institution is key for its efficacy, the very availability of these tools and
the prospect of their use also shapes the operation of international institutions and keeps
them generally aligned with U.S. interests. The U.S. does not have to exercise its power
to influence.
Funding.134 Perhaps most obvious, just like Congress can threaten or formally
limit the agency budget, designate the funding for specific purposes and condition
increases on the achievement of certain goals, the U.S. done so with some international
institutions.135 This tool is uniquely available to the U.S. because it is often the single
biggest financial supporter of international institutions.136 The U.S. is the largest
contributor to the IMF and World Bank,137 and it contributes almost 22 percent of the
U.N.’s operating budget. In fact, in the 1990s, the U.S. successfully conditioned payment
of its outstanding dues to the U.N. on changes to its institutional structure to address
corruption concerns and increase transparency.138 Further, when the UNSC authorizes the
use of force it relies on the contribution of the member states for enforcement.139 The
U.S. is by some distance the biggest supplier of troops, funding and materiel to U.N.
“coalition” forces. For example, when the UNSC authorized the use of force to remove
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Iraqi troops from Kuwait in 1991,140 the U.N. turned to the U.S. and other countries for
support. Unsurprisingly, the U.S. led the coalition and contributed the vast majority of
troops and material to the effort.141 Even during the recent UNSC-sanctioned campaign in
Libya,142 the U.S. had to supply the bulk of munitions and intelligence because France
and other countries were running out of resources.143
Side Payments and Foreign Aid.144 Similarly, the U.S. uses side-payments and attaches
conditions on foreign aid to influence (or lobby) states to support U.S. initiatives both
within and outside of international institutions. We can imagine the U.S. using economic
influence—some observable, some unobservable—to secure support for U.S. initiatives
within international institutions or circumvent them. At the U.N., after it became clear
that the UNSC would not provide a resolution authorizing the use of force for the Second
Gulf War, President George W. Bush created a “coalition of the willing”145 that included
140

United Nations Security Council Resolution 678, S-RES-678 (1990), adopted Nov. 29, 1990
(authorizing the U.S.e of “all necessary means” against Iraq beginning January 16, 1991, and requesting the
States to provide support).
141
The U.S. contributed more than 500,000 troops against Iraq during Operation Desert Shield and Desert
Storm – more than four times the amount of the next nation. The U.S. also provided more than 3,000 tanks
and planes. Daniel S. Papp, The Gulf War Coalition: The Politics and Economics of a Most Unusual
Alliance, in THE EAGLE IN THE DESERT: LOOKING BACK ON U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN THE PERSIAN GULF WAR
21, 22 (William Head & Earl H. Tilford, Jr. eds. 1996).
142
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973, S-RES-1973 (2011), adopted March 17, 2011
(authorizing the U.S.e of “all necessary means” to protect Libyan civilians and serving as the basis for
military intervention).
143
Borzou Daragahi & Brian Bennett, Libya Bombing Campaign Targets Kadafi’s Air, Ground Forces,
L.A. TIMES, March 21, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/mar/21/world/la-fg-libya-fighting-20110321
(“One problem the administration faces is that even though Obama wants the U.S> to play a supporting
role in Libya – and, indeed, the first strike came from a French fighter jet – only the United States has the
resources to launch the complex operations to clear Kadafi’s air defenses.”); see James Kirkup, Damien
McElroy & Henry Samuel, Libya: U.S. Urged to Return to Front Line, TELEGRAPH, April 12, 2011,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8449063/Libya-US-urged-toreturn-to-front-line.html (reporting on France’s suggestion that the U.S. should deploy its resources in the
Libya operations again); Meera Selva & Danica Kirka, Europe’s Libya Campaign Comes Under Scrutiny
SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, June 14, 2011), http://www.utsandiego.com/news/2011/jun/14/europes-libyacampaign-comes-under-scrutiny/ (reporting that France and Britain have been struggling with a lack of
munitions and equipment).
144
Side payments have long been U.S.ed as a means of procuring cooperation with the U.S. international
policy goals. In 1911, the U.S. made side payments to both Great Britain and Japan to seal the 1911 North
Pacific Fur Seal Treaty. SCOTT BARRETT, ENVIRONMENT AND STATECRAFT 34 (2003). More recently, the
U.S. supplied North Korea with fuel oil and constructed two light-water reactors for North Korea’s
continued participation in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Alan Riding, U.S. and North Korea Sign
Pact to End Nuclear Dispute, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1994, at A5; Royal C. Gardner, Exporting American
Values: Tenth Amendment Principles and International Environmental Assistance, 22 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 1, 34 (1998) (discussing the incentives provided to China and India to accede to the Montreal Protocol
including a provision creating a fund for grants and concessional loans to developing natures to enable their
compliance).
145
Hamada Zahawi, Comment, Redefining the Laws of Occupation in the Wake of Operation Iraqi
“Freedom,” 95 CAL. L. REV. 2295, 2296 (2007) (“On March 19, 2003 President George W. Bush
proclaimed, ‘My fellow citizens, at this hour, American and coalition forces are in the early stages of
military operations to disarm Iraq, to free its people and to defend the world from grave danger.’ With
those words the United States and its ‘Coalition of the Willing’ launched Operation Iraqi Freedom.”).

33

states which received cash or in-kind payments in exchange for supporting the U.S.146
When the U.S. expressed concern that the International Criminal Court (“ICC”) might
gain custody over Americans abroad, the U.S. conditioned the receipt of foreign aid to
some countries on their willingness to refuse to turn over Americans to the ICC.147
Moreover, since the U.S. has a substantial role in determining which states receive World
Bank loans and IMF support, the U.S. has encouraged the attachment of many conditions
on aid, forcing the recipients—who often cannot access private capital markets—to
liberalize their economies, cut the public sector and pass austerity packages. 148 Many
have criticized the conditions attached to aid as the U.S. imposing its policy preferences
under duress.149 The takeaway is that the U.S. has tools to influence the product of
international institutions by shaping the preferences of the member states.
Create New Institutions. Another tool that the U.S. has used to maintain influence
over international institutions is simply creating a new one when, for whatever reason,
the old institution has been ineffective or unresponsive to U.S. interests. For the example,
in the negotiations to form the WTO, the U.S. and other large economic powers withdrew
from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and forced the developing countries to
either join the new WTO in a single undertaking or remain outside the new international
trade system.150 The U.S. and others forced the developing countries to join on their
terms or lose access to the world’s largest economic markets. Of course, this tool is costly
and requires participation from other states with similar interests but it remains available
depending on the degree to which the international institution deviates from U.S.
interests.
Withdrawal. The U.S. can refuse to join international institutions, withdraw or
only provisionally participate in international institutions that have acted or are likely to
act consistently against U.S. interests. For example, the U.S. refused to join the League of
Nations in the early twentieth century, likely condemning it to failure at its inception.
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More recently, the U.S. signed but eventually indicated its intent not to become a party to
the Rome Treaty creating the International Criminal Court.151 Since the U.S. was
particularly concerned with the ICC’s potential to create liability for both parties and
non-parties to the treaty, the U.S. simply passed domestic legislation152 and signed
Article 98 agreements with state parties to the ICC to ensure that Americans would not
fall under its jurisdiction.153 In 2005, after the ICJ’s decision in Avena, the U.S. withdrew
from the Optional Protocol of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations,154 which
provided that the ICJ would have jurisdiction for claims under the convention.155 Even
earlier, in 1984, the U.S. withdrew from the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ after the
Nicaragua case156 and refused to participate in the ICJ’s proceedings.
Though the discussion does not cover all the mechanisms available to the U.S., it
demonstrates that the U.S. has substantial tools to affect the conduct of international
institutions by influencing the organization’s procedural rules, the composition of the
rulemaking body and the agenda of the relevant decision makers. The U.S. can engage in
both intra-institution and inter-institution logrolling, shift decision-making authority
across multiple organizational bodies,157 or create narrow or issue-specific
organizations,158 to make organizations more responsive to U.S. interests. Agency costs
exist in both domestic and international delegations but, given the U.S.’s oversight
mechanisms, those costs might not differ significantly.

C.

Acts and Omissions of International Institutions

By now it is clear that the U.S. has ex ante and ex post
operations of international institutions and ensure that
American interests. Depending on the structure of the
relevant issue, and the interests of the other states, the
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mechanism that is most likely to generate the preferred outcome. For reasons related to
the U.S.’s power advantage, the U.S. has a broader set of tools to shape the final work
product of the international institution.
But the U.S.’s asymmetric power advantage does not mean that the U.S. can
influence international institutions in all situations; rather, the U.S. can stop initiatives
that it doesn’t like but it can’t always push through institutional objectives that it prefers.
For example, the U.S.’s veto on the UNSC means the U.S. can stop the UNSC from
acting contrary to U.S. interests, but it doesn’t mean that the U.S. can always force the
UN to act consistently with U.S. preferences. Of course, the U.S. has other tools to
encourage other states to align themselves with U.S. preferences—some of those tools
were outlined above—but the U.S. can’t guarantee that the international institution will
always act in certain way. On balance, the U.S. can often get what it wants out of an
international institution, and can almost always block initiatives that it dislikes.
Why is this important? The dynamic described above suggests that the
international institutions have a status-quo bias, one that favors the state or states that
have designed, funded and retained operational control of international institutions: in
most instances, the U.S.. Since the international institutions generally cannot act without
U.S. consent, they cannot hurt the U.S.; in principal agent terms, the agent cannot act
without the principal’s approval. The key point is that there is no accountability issue
with international institutions since the U.S. can block the initiatives it opposes and
generally push through those that it supports. Thus, the acts and omissions of
international institutions are unlikely generate the kind of agency costs that warrant a
formal limit on international delegations.

D.

The Future of International Delegations

Finally, the argument outlined here focuses on the U.S.’s asymmetric power
advantage in creating international institutions and ensuring some operational control
through ex ante and ex post mechanisms. But the U.S. will not maintain this power
forever and, sooner or later, its influence over international institutions will begin to
wane. Does this potential eventuality support the critics’ contention that delegations
create high agency costs?
The answer to this question requires consideration of the international political
environment in which the U.S. operates. If the U.S. is the dominant power in
international politics, the mechanisms outlined above will allow the U.S. to maintain
effective control over international institutions, sharply reducing agency costs and
accountability issues. This suggests that, at least while the U.S. is dominant, international
delegations to international institutions do not present serious problems. However, if the
U.S. is only one of two or three dominant countries in the world, then the U.S.’s ability to
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control the international institution diminishes, creating greater accountability concerns.
In such an international environment, international delegations become more problematic
and they will likely present more significant principal-agent concerns. Thus, the ability of
the U.S. to influence international institutions—and the wisdom of international
delegations—is a function of the level of constraint on the U.S.159
Now even a world in which the U.S. is no longer dominant, it is unclear why
limits on international delegations are necessary when Congress and the President will be
able to assess the U.S.’s ability to influence an international institution before delegating
decision-making authority. Congress and the President are well placed to analyze the
costs and benefits of a specific delegation to an international institution and, given the
possibility that the international institution might make decisions inconsistent with U.S.
interests, Congress and the President will likely be sensitive to the consequences of
international delegation for the American people. In other words, Congress and the
President are already fully incentivized to internalize the costs of international
delegations and ensure that the international institutions with delegated authority are
accountable to U.S. interests.

IV.

CONCLUSION

This Article’s central claim here is that similar accountability issues are present in
both domestic and international delegations, and that a similar range of oversight tools
are available to the U.S.. If agency costs are comparable, we can better assess arguments
in favor of creating supermajority requirements, requiring a clear statement rule or
endorsing additional political branch authorization for international delegations.
These arguments rest on the mistaken presumption that agency costs are high in
the international delegations and as a result ex ante constraints are necessary to ensure
accountability. But, as this Article has demonstrated, such constraints are unnecessary. In
fact, given the steps that the U.S. has taken to ensure the accountability in non-binding
international delegations, it likely that Congress and the President are already cognizant
of the potential costs and benefits of international delegations when they provide their
joint consent through the Article II process for treaties or the Article I general lawmaking
procedures for congressional-executive agreements. It is unlikely that the political
branches would need a clear statement requirement or a default of non-self execution to
force them to internalize the costs of delegating binding authority to an international
institution; the political branches are well aware of the costs and benefits of international
delegations. Congress and the President’s use of reservations, understandings and
159
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declarations in the treaty context, for example, demonstrate that awareness. Again, given
the U.S.’s role in the conception, design and operation of many of the world’s most
important international organizations, it is hard to imagine the U.S. delegating binding
authority to an international institution that would act consistently against American
interests or impose net costs on the U.S.
International delegations are in many ways substantially similar to domestic
delegations. They both generate agency costs and, in both contexts, the U.S., acting
through Congress and the President, have similar oversight mechanisms to reduce them.
The specific agency costs in any single international delegations are likely to rest on
myriad context-sensitive factors that make a general assessment difficult. But what is
clear is that proposals in support of limits on binding international delegations require
greater clarity on the measures of agency costs, the efficacy of oversight mechanisms,
and the assumptions about the operation of international institutions. Given the
prominence of international governance in the American political discourse, Congress
and the President are fully incentivized to consider carefully the wisdom of both binding
and nonbinding international delegations; national constitutional design limits are
unnecessary.
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